This piece combines findings from three audits we ran on Island business sites over the past year. The details differ; the pattern does not.
None of these sites had been attacked. They had simply been left alone, and the things that keep a site working had quietly expired or never been set up.
What the audits found
- The domain was registered to a contractor’s personal email, with renewal charged to a card that had since expired.
- A plugin stack of 24 extensions, several unpatched for two years, and two that had been abandoned by their authors.
- Contact forms sending mail from a server with no SPF or DKIM record, so half the enquiries went to spam. Nobody had noticed because the form still said "thanks".
- Backups written to the same disk as the live site, and no record of a restore ever being tested.
The first week of fixes
Ownership came first: registrar and DNS moved to the business owner’s account with two-factor authentication, and recovery contacts verified. Then we removed unused plugins and staging copies, updated what remained, and replaced the form handling with authenticated email plus server-side validation and a honeypot.
Finally, backups moved off the production server, and we restored one to a test environment to prove the process worked. That restore took 40 minutes and found a missing uploads folder — exactly the kind of thing you want to discover before an outage.
The monthly routine
- Apply dependency updates on a copy of the site, test the key pages and forms, then deploy.
- Check that backups ran and restore one file to confirm the archive is readable.
- Review uptime and form delivery alerts, including anything that recovered on its own.
- Renew certificates and review domain and hosting expiry dates a month ahead.
- Read the error log once. Patterns show up there before customers complain.
Why this is cheaper than an emergency
A monthly routine is a few hours of work. Recovering a compromised site without clean backups is days of lost enquiries, a possible re-build and an awkward conversation with customers whose data was exposed.
The goal is boring: a site that quietly does its job, with records clear enough that anyone competent could take over tomorrow.